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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Clean bill of health 
After meeting with President Yel'tsin, the surgeons Rene Akchurin and Michael 
DeBakey pronounced him in good health. DeBakey even ventured to assess 
Yel'tsin's health in political terms. "There is no basis on health grounds why he 
should not run again," DeBakey claimed. (Reuters, 22 May 98) 
 
APPARAT 
Yel'tsin's favorite advisers examined 
Obshchaya gazeta (23-29 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-134) discusses the new 
"favorites" among Yel'tsin's advisers. Dyachenko, Yumashev and Yastrzhembsky 
figure prominently, as could be expected. The article argues that the trio's lack of 
independent political ambitions contribute to their clout, but the inability of the 
president to "keep up with [his] schedule of meetings" has also shifted a greater 
sense of authority to these key personnel. The paper does note that, although 
these advisers are remarkably influential, Yel'tsin does still maintain firm control 
of crucial issues, such as the final word on government personnel appointments. 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
SC convenes to address economic concerns 
Yel'tsin's convocation of the Security Council on 25 May 98 may have been an 
attempt to soothe a volatile Russian stock market, in light of the miners' protests 
and generally disturbing economic news, but it also revealed important aspects 
of the relationship of economic and political reform. 
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The Security Council, which is composed primarily of defense, foreign and 
national security personnel, would not seem to be the appropriate organ to 
address economic distress. The recent miners' strikes however, may have 
demonstrated the potential social unrest and turmoil that the continuing wage 
arrears and declining standards of living may provoke. With few options available 
for economic redress of grievances, the Yel'tsin government may be considering 
alternate methods of maintaining domestic tranquility. 
 
As a result of the meeting, the members resolved to make greater efforts to meet 
the concerns of the miners (blaming the previous government for failing in this 
regard) and set up a special commission on stabilizing the situation in the North 
Caucasus, to be headed by Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Yel'tsin orders spending cuts 
In light of the deepening financial crisis, President Yel'tsin signed a decree 
ordering Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko to cut government spending in the 
amount of 40 billion rubles. (UPI, 26 May 98) The move failed to assuage foreign 
investors however, as the stock market lost another five percent of its value. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough 
 
START-II discussion in June? Yel'tsin to push issue at meeting of 'four' 
Parliamentary hearings on the ratification of the Russian-US START-II treaty 
could be held as early as June, according to Vladimir Ryzhkov, first deputy 
chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma. "The Duma Council's decision 
to postpone the ratification hearings until the fall doesn't really mean anything," 
the deputy speaker told ITAR-TASS on 20 May. If the defense ministry or the 
foreign ministry, acting on behalf of the government, asks the Duma to hold the 
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hearings, it will respond positively and may schedule them as early as June, the 
first deputy speaker said. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1416 GMT, 20 May 98; 
FBIS-TAC-98-140) 
 
President Boris Yel'tsin planned to initiate a discussion on the START-II strategic 
arms reduction treaty at his meeting with the prime minister and the chairmen of 
both houses of parliament on 21 May, presidential spokesman Sergei 
Yastrzhembsky told reporters 20 May. A serious and profound discussion on the 
treaty is required, the spokesman said. The Duma may have an approach of its 
own but there should be no or "cheap populism among deputies," he said. 
(Interfax, 1107 GMT, 20 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-140) 
 
Russia advocates closed border between Kosovo, Albania 
Russia is interested in "a fairly tightly closed border between Albania and Kosovo 
because terrorists, militants and arms are crossing it," Russian foreign ministry 
spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin told a briefing in Moscow on 21 May. 
Rakhmanin, speaking of the possible involvement of NATO in that region, said it 
is Russia's principled stance that any use of force is possible only under a 
resolution of the UN Security Council or the OSCE." [quote as received] He said 
there are experts from NATO and the Western European Union in Albania who 
are helping to revive the Albanian army and police after the 1997 crisis. (Interfax, 
1230 GMT, 21 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-141) 
 
Results of G-8 summit emerging from Moscow 
Following the G-8 summit in England, President Boris Yel'tsin stated that the 
Russian government must find its way into all large international organizations, 
Yel'tsin told ministers on 20 May. "We must enter the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) by all means this year," he said. Russia's influence has significantly 
increased as a result of the G-8 summit, Yel'tsin said. He called on the 
government to build on these achievements. (Interfax, 1021 GMT, 20 May 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-140) 
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British Prime Minister Tony Blair praised the Russian contribution to the 
Birmingham summit. Blair told ITAR-TASS that President Yel'tsin played an 
exclusively constructive role in the summit debates. The premier noted it would 
have been hard to solve many important problems, including the Indian nuclear 
tests and the Pakistani stance, without the firm and decisive support of Yel'tsin. 
Under the summit decision, Russia will join the international working group on 
nuclear security which has been formed under the G-8, Blair said. (ITAR-TASS, 
1459 GMT, 17 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-137) 
 
Moscow criticizes Pakistan's nuclear test, urges India to revise policy 
Pakistan staging nuclear tests will "trigger a very negative reaction" in Moscow, 
sources in the Russian foreign ministry told Interfax 19 May. The sources 
expressed the hope that Pakistan "will take into consideration the international 
community's calls and refrain from holding a nuclear explosion in response to the 
nuclear tests conducted by India previously." (Interfax, 0917 GMT, 19 May 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-139)  
 
Russia has denounced India's recent nuclear tests and has urged India to revise 
its nuclear policy and join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the 
comprehensive ban of nuclear tests without any conditions. (ITAR-TASS, 1459 
GMT, 15 May 98; FBIS-TAC-98-135) Although Moscow is stressing a 
comprehensive test ban in India, Russian leaders have stressed that economic 
sanctions against India would be counterproductive, and unjustified from the 
point of view of international law and from the humanitarian point of view, the 
foreign ministry said in a press release. (Interfax, 1417 GMT, 15 May 98; FBIS-
TAC-98-135) 
 
Primakov draws 'red line' limit for NATO 
During the international conference "A New Security Architecture in Europe" held 
in Moscow (organized by the Anti-NATO Commission in the State Duma, the 
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Russian foreign ministry, and Yu. Luzhkov and Yu. Petrov's Russian Movement 
for New Socialism), Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov stated there is a "red 
line" which Russia cannot allow NATO to cross. That "red line" is the acceptance 
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the military bloc. If these states were 
accepted, the Russian Federation's reaction would have to be appropriately 
harsh and its relations with NATO radically reviewed. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 12 
May 98, p. 7; FBIS-SOV-98-133) 
 
Duma warns threat of regional conflict in Russian south 
A threat of a serious regional conflict is possible in southern Russia, head of the 
Duma international committee Vladimir Lukin told ITAR-TASS on 12 May. "I think 
that the Caspian problem can also pose a threat to our country under certain 
unfavorable circumstances," he noted. A nuclear war threat is "unlikely but it has 
not disappeared. Recent nuclear tests in an Asian country are a proof to that," 
Lukin said. A threat of a conventional war in Europe is unlikely as well, "but I 
cannot say it has disappeared," Lukin said. "Many old threats are really gone, but 
new threats have appeared, including those in the East, where they are possible 
under certain circumstances." (ITAR-TASS, 1538 GMT, 12 May 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-132) 
 
Yel'tsin announces objectives of 'dynamic foreign policy' 
During a 45-minute speech before Russian diplomats at the foreign ministry, 
President Yel'tsin stressed that Russia should pursue "a dynamic foreign policy" 
founded on four "important objectives": "Maintaining territorial integrity, 
democratizing society, providing for national security, and reforming our economy 
and integrating it into the global market economy." (ITAR-TASS World Service, 
0820 GMT, 12 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-132) He also spoke of the need to 
maintain a positive relationship with the United States, but "without rolling over 
before that country." "Russia is developing an equal relationship with the United 
States," he said. (Interfax, 0905 GMT, 12 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-132) 
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Yel'tsin's speech was viewed by many as a "programmatic" presentation 
stressing Russia's place and role in the formation of a multipolar world, and 
charging the Russian diplomats present to work toward such a goal. According to 
Yel'tsin, "Russia's potential to exert a positive influence on world events has 
increased in a major way in the new conditions." As a positive illustration he cited 
"our astuteness in involving UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in the Iraq 
problem, which successfully prevented the situation from getting to the point 
where force would be used." (Pravda, 13 May 98, p. 1; FBIS-SOV-98-132) 
 
Iran-Russia relations strengthened over Tajik peace 
Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi sent a reply to his Russian counterpart 
Yevgeni Primakov which stated that cooperation between Russia and Iran in the 
settlement of the inter-Tajik conflict is "constructive" and that Iran is ready to 
"strengthen this cooperation." (Interfax, 0826 GMT, 5 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-125) 
The Iranian minister underscored the importance of implementing all accords 
reached during Tajik peace negotiations as a basis for establishment of a lasting 
peace in that war-torn country. Referring to the constructive role of Iran and the 
Russian Federation in ensuring the success of the Tajik peace talks, Kharrazi 
expressed Iran's readiness to follow its cooperation with Russia in this regard 
given the mandates of both countries as guarantors of the Tajik peace accord. 
Kharrazi also expressed hope that Tehran-Moscow relations would continue to 
expand in the future. (IRNA, 1435 GMT, 5 May 98; FBIS-NES-98-125) 
 
Iran's atomic chief in Moscow 
The director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, 
concluded a six-day visit to Moscow and other Russian cities and returned to 
Tehran 19 May. In Moscow, he signed a protocol with the Russian minister of 
atomic energy that provided for the schedule of operations to be undertaken by 
the Russian side for completing the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power 
plant in southern Iran. During the visit the secretary general of Russia's National 
Security Council, Kukushin, told the Iranian minister that Russian President Boris 
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Yel'tsin insisted on closer collaboration with Iran in every area. Kukushin said 
Moscow condemned imposition on Moscow of foreign dictates concerning 
relations with Iran and said that Russia would not rally behind the United States 
in its anti-Iran position. (IRNA, 2022 GMT, 19 May 98; FBIS-NES-98-139) 
 
Japanese prime minister's proposal leaked 
A Japanese paper leaked details of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's secret 
initiative on resolving the Kuril islands dispute. According to the paper, the prime 
minister proposes redrawing the national border south of Iturup Island, not to the 
north of all four islands as previously demanded. Many press accounts noted that 
Hashimoto presented a secret proposal to President Yel'tsin at their recent "no 
neckties" meeting. This marks a major policy shift for Tokyo, which until now 
linked the signing of a peace treaty to the "favorable resolution" of the Kuril issue 
and the transfer of all four islands back to Japan (ITAR-TASS, 10 May 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-130). For its part, Moscow has stated that it will not officially reply to the 
Japanese proposal until this autumn when Hashimoto visits Moscow (ITAR-
TASS, 15 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-135). 
 
Bilateral fishing treaty signed 
Russia and Japan have signed a treaty regulating fishing around the disputed 
Kuril Islands. The accord allows Japanese fishing boats to operate safely within 
12 nautical miles of the islands (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai 
group of islets) which are located off Japan's northernmost main island. By 
agreement, Japanese boats are allowed to catch up to 1,200 tons of fish in 1998, 
while Japan will provide Russia with 10 million yen to help preserve fishing 
resources and 15 million yen worth of fishing gear. The treaty should help end a 
series of confrontations between Russian coastal vessels and Japanese fishing 
boats, several of which ended in injuries to Japanese fishermen, and is seen as a 
step toward the eventual signing of a Russo-Japanese peace treaty (Kyodo, 21 
May 98; FBIS-EAS-98-141). 
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Russian-Japanese contract signed on lunar exploration 
Moscow has found a new country to help keep its space program alive. A 
Russian research and production company signed a contract with a Japanese 
company to cooperate in exploration of the moon. Specifically, the companies will 
collaborate in creating "space vehicles" designed for lunar exploration (Interfax, 
28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-118). Additional cooperation, and therefore funding, will 
come as a result of Japan's accession to the International Space Station (ISS) 
program. Examples of information exchange include visits of Japanese 
astronauts to Russia's training center at "Star City," a Japanese liaison group 
setting up permanent offices in the Russian Flight Control Center, and 
consultations on designing booster rockets for space launch vehicles (ITAR-
TASS, 1011 GMT, 29 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-119). 
 
Yel'tsin to host summit with China's Jiang Zemin 3-6 September 
President Yel'tsin seems to like making fashion statements at his meetings with 
national leaders. Following his "no neckties" meeting with the Japanese prime 
minister, Yel'tsin has announced that he will have a "meeting without jackets" 
with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Moscow in early September. The two are 
to discuss "various plans for interaction between the two countries in the Asian-
Pacific region and possible joint participation in large-scale regional economic 
projects, including in the fuel and energy sector and engineering" (Interfax, 2 May 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-132). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS 
Zaveryukha wins Duma seat in far east 
 9 
Aleksandr Zaveryukha has won a seat in the State Duma in Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatsky with 20 percent of the vote. Zaveryukha, a former agriculture 
minister and deputy prime minister, beat Vladislav Shved of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, who polled 17 percent. Elections for the regional council, 
which were held simultaneously, were declared invalid because of the low 
turnout. (ITAR-TASS, 0840 GMT 20 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-110) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma seeks court ruling on Kirienko re-nomination 
The Constitutional Court received a Duma inquiry questioning the legality of 
Yel'tsin's decision to nominate the same person for prime minister three times. 
Court Chairman Marat Baglay said the court cannot be guided "by considerations 
of political expediency" in its work and must follow a special procedure for 
hearing important inquiries. The procedure consists of deciding the "correctness" 
of the inquiry, and the court must decide within two months if it will hear the case. 
If the court agrees to hear the case, it will be put "on the waiting list." For these 
reasons, the court can only hear the Kirienko appeal, as well as the Trophy Art 
Law Yel'tsin is appealing, in the second half of 1998. 
 
Clearly the Constitutional Court is busy and cases brought before it must wait 
their turn, but the special time considerations and the importance of the Kirienko 
nomination might suggest that a review of the case should be expedited. 
(Interfax, 1730 GMT, 20 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-110) 
 
Duma approves Kirienko as prime minister 
After two previous attempts, the State Duma finally confirmed Sergei Kirienko as 
prime minister in a secret ballot. Kiriyenko received 251 votes in favor and 25 
votes against. A simple majority of the Duma membership was required for 
Kirienko's confirmation. 
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In total, 315 of the 445 Duma deputies present took ballot papers for the secret 
vote; however, only 276 ballots were retrieved from the ballot boxes at the end of 
voting. (Interfax, 1220 GMT, 24 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-114) 
 
Duma deputy Semago discusses lobbying activity 
Vladimir Semago, Duma deputy and member of the Commission to Fight 
Corruption, confirmed the existence of many questionable lobbying practices in 
the Duma. For instance, Semago admitted that confidential information 
concerning the content of laws regulating a specific industry have been offered to 
representatives of that industry for a price or guarantee of future financial support 
in election campaigns. The result is that the Duma drafts many laws legalizing 
the suspect activities of a small number of people or groups. Witness the 
enormous number of small laws concerning fishing, mining, or banking. 
 
Semago also admits that the ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky is a 
professional lobbyist, pushing the interests of Iraq, Libya, and one or another 
financial-industrial group. "The earmarks of somebody's business are always 
visible behind any piece of paper that comes from Zhirinovskiy." 
 
Often groups lobbying the Duma claim to represent the downtrodden and 
disaffected, when in reality they are only furthering the interests of their powerful 
patrons. For instance, the Agrarian Party does not really promote the interests of 
the agricultural sector as a whole; rather, the Agrarians seem interested in 
defending the interests of particular persons at the expense of the individual 
farmer. 
 
Semago also says that Most, Menatep, and Oneksim are the companies most 
active in lobbying the Duma for favors. "There is no denying that many deputies 
simply used the support of these or other companies and firms during elections. 
And this, incidentally, is not a crime." 
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Semago also admits that Duma deputies use their positions to threaten and 
coerce people so as to defend the interests of their supporters. "Suppose some 
regional law enforcement agency is discovered to be collecting compromising 
information on some person, this person could turn to a Duma deputy who might 
send a letter to the region's governor threatening to send the federal prosecutor 
to investigate human rights abuses in the region." 
 
Such activity is a sword with two edges: on one hand, nothing distorts and 
undermines the democratic process like favoritism. On the other hand, in a 
political system with a weak judicial system, the affected person or group cannot 
rely simply on the law to guarantee his rights. In such a system, the personal 
intervention of Duma deputies may be necessary to mitigate the capricious 
activities of regional power brokers. 
 
There have been many attempts to pass legislation regulating lobbying activity, 
but nothing has come of them. Semago fears the time is still not ripe for the 
needed legislation. It should also be added that until the law and the agents of its 
enforcement are respected, legislation regulating lucrative lobbying activity will 
most likely be circumvented anyway. (Interfaks-AiF, 30 Mar-5 Apr 98, No. 13, p. 
19; FBIS-SOV-98-118) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Dwyer Dennis and Curtis Stevens 
 
Out with the old--in with the new at Rosvooruzhenie? 
Director General Yevgeni Ananev of Russia's Rosvooruzhenie state arms 
exporter may soon be replaced by his predecessor, Aleksandr Kotelkin, 
according to a recent Pravda report. Sergei Kirienko, the new prime minister, is 
said to have a "largely negative" attitude toward the current leadership, which 
took control only last fall. He apparently blames the Urinson-Ananev team for lost 
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foreign markets and revenue amounting to nearly $1 billion. Since Ananev's 
placement as director by Vice Premier Yakov Urinson, both the Indonesia and 
Ecuador arms deals have fallen through and not a single major contract has 
concluded. (Pravda, 5 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-126) 
 
It is unclear as to whether Kotelkin will actually take over the directorship or be 
placed in charge of an oversight organ (i.e., a recreated State Committee for the 
Defense Sectors of Industry) that would provide top-level direction of arms sales 
for the three state arms sales/technology agencies now existing. It also remains 
to be seen how Urinson would react to such a move as it represents an obvious 
loss of influence, especially from the financing perspective. Urinson and Ananev 
have direct ties to both the Mapo and the Strategiya banks, while Kotelkin 
historically favored the Uneximbank in working defense industry deals. 
 
Meanwhile, Ananev continues to tout the nearly $8.5 billion in projected orders 
through 2003 as evidence of success. A recent joint announcement by Ananev 
and the mayor of St. Petersburg, Vladimir Yakovlev, placed that region's piece of 
the pie at over 20 percent and served to highlight the effectiveness of the newly 
formed Rosvooruzhenie regional offices. According to a Rossiyskaya gazeta 
report, directors of local enterprises report that the overall attitude of the state 
arms company is changing from that of a monopolistic guard dog of arms sales 
to a proactive team player providing support and expert advice. (Rossiyskaya 
gazeta, 30 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-127) 
 
Russian aviation industry continues its decline 
Interfax reported recently that, according to aviation industry experts, both 
military and civilian aviation is continuing to deteriorate. The civil aviation industry 
output has declined four to five times since 1990 while military aviation capability 
has declined due to a lack of new equipment, spare parts, and aviation fuel to 
support operational/training sorties. Military training flights are nine to eleven 
times below requirement. It is estimated that over 1.5 billion rubles are needed 
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just to maintain the entire net of military aerodomes. (Interfax, 0740 GMT, 4 May 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-124) 
 
On 5 May Interfax released presidential spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky's 
announcement that President Yel'tsin had instructed Kirienko to stabilize the 
military budget. (Interfax, 1259 GMT, 5 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-125) What is not 
revealed is whether that stabilization will take the form of increased budget levels 
or result in further decreases in the Russian military infrastructure. Given the 
recent history of the Russian military budget, the accumulating unfunded 
operating costs, and the resulting decline in operational effectiveness (see flight 
hours), it is likely that not only further but even more drastic reductions in 
infrastructure are ahead. 
 
15 generals serve in Duma 
A 10 April article in Komsomol'skaya pravda detailed the retired generals serving 
in the Duma. The fifteen generals and their previous active duty commands 
include: 
1. Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin (former commander of the Eighth Guard Army 
Corps, Volgograd). 
2. Colonel General Valentin Varennikov (former commander-in-chief of the 
infantry, USSR deputy minister of defense). 
3. Lieutenant General Mikhail Surkov (former chief of the political department of 
the Guard Army and secretary of the All-Army Party Committee of the CPSU). 
4. Air Force General Nikolai Bezborodov (former chief of the High Military-
Political Aviation School). 
5. Colonel General Albert Makashov (former troop commander of the Volga-Ural 
Military District). 
6. Lieutenant General Aleksandr Korzhakov (former chief of the president's 
Security Service). 
7. Lieutenant General Nikolai Stolyarov (former chief of the Ministry of Defense 
Political Administration). 
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8. Colonel General Boris Gromov (former deputy minister of defense). 
9. Major General Roman Polkovich (chief of the Krasnogorsk Garrison). 
10. Major General Ibragim Suleimenov (former military commissar of Chechnya). 
11. Colonel General Eduard Vorobev (former first deputy commander of the 
infantry, deputy minister of defense). 
12. Lieutenant General Gennadi Benov (former chief of the Air Force Political 
Administration). 
13. KGB Major General Valeri Vorotnikov (former chief of the Fifth Directorate of 
the USSR KGB). 
14. Major General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Nikolai Panarin (former chief 
of the Internal Affairs Administration for Tula Oblast). 
15. Colonel General of Aviation Georgi Titov (cosmonaut, former first deputy 
commander of the Armed Forces). (Komsomol'skaya pravda, 10 Apr 98, p. 4; 
FBIS-SOV-98-124) 
 
Comment 
Since this article was received, the former commander-in-chief of the Border 
Guards, General Nikolaev, has been elected to the Duma and, of course, 
Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed, former commander of the 14th Army in the 
Dniestr, was elected to a governorship in Siberia. The two main military 
contenders for the 2000 presidential election will most likely be Lebed and 
Nikolaev. 
 
NASA head expresses concern 
In testimony to the US House of Representatives Science Committee, NASA 
administrator Daniel Golden said he erred in letting Russia take on the 
construction of a key component of the international space program. The 
Russians are building the service module where astronauts will live. The launch 
timetable for the station has been pushed back because of delays in the Russian 
portion of the space station. "In retrospect, I wish that we built the ... module," he 
told the committee hearing. But he did say that Russian participation was still 
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clearly a net gain for the United States. (Reuters, 1553 PDT, 6 May 98; C-
reuters@clari.net) 
 
Yel'tsin says attack on Russia still possible 
At a VE-day Kremlin reception for senior military commanders and security 
service leaders, President Yel'tsin said an attack on Russia was still possible. 
Speaking on the importance of military reform, the president stated "The final 
goal of the military reform is to form smaller but efficient Armed Forces, armed 
with advanced hardware and well-trained personnel. ... I am confident that this 
kind of reform will not impair Russia's potential to deter, in particular a nuclear 
attack, and repel an aggression if necessary. We cannot afford discarding the 
possibility of aggression." 
 
At the same reception, President Yel'tsin expressed an interest in reviving a 
tsarist tradition where senior officers were presented to the emperor. Since the 
17th century military officers had been presented to the head of state but "since 
1917 everything collapsed. Now we want to revive this glorious tradition. Every 
senior officer will see the head of state when he is promoted." (Interfax, 0900 
GMT, 8 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-128) 
 
Black Sea Fleets to gain two cruisers 
The Ukrainian government announced plans to complete the Soviet Slava-class 
cruiser Admiral Lobov and commission it into the Ukrainian navy as the Ukrainia. 
The ship is 95 percent complete and has been under construction sporadically 
since 1984. The decision to complete the ship came after attempts to sell the 
ship failed. The Ukrainia will become the flagship of the Ukrainian navy. 
 
Meanwhile, the Russians announced that overhaul of the Slava (renamed the 
Moskva) is nearly complete. The Slava/Moskva entered Ukraine's Nikolaiv 
shipyard in 1990 for an overhaul and, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
ship remained in limbo awaiting a decision by the Russian Navy to either 
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complete the overhaul, sell or scrap the ship. The Moskva will become the 
flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The former Slava operated frequently in 
the eastern Mediterranean during the 1980s in operations monitoring the US 
Sixth Fleet. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 14 May 98) 
 
Comment 
As reported in an earlier Digest, the Moscow city council has funded the 
completion of the Moskva's overhaul. The renaming of the ship is politically 
significant since the mayor of Moscow has been very vocal in demanding the 
return of Crimea to Russia. A previous Moskva was commissioned in the Soviet 
Navy in 1967 and served as the first helicopter carrier in the Soviet Navy. 
 
Russian marines in Denmark 
Some two dozen Russian marines from the Baltic Fleet are in Denmark 
participating in a NATO Partnership for Peace exercise. This marks the first time 
Russian combat troops have participated in a NATO exercise. Over 3,000 troops 
from 17 nations are participating in the two-week event designed to practice 
multinational search, rescue and evacuation operations. (Voice of Russia World 
Service, 1310 GMT, 16 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-136, and Jamestown Foundation 
Monitor, 21 May 98) 
 
Russian/Turkish military chiefs meet 
The chiefs of the Russian and Turkish general staffs meet in Moscow on 20 May 
and signed a memorandum of mutual understanding. The memorandum is 
designed to be a framework for detailed discussions on other areas of mutual 
concern. Of note is that Russia and Turkey will hold talks on the preparation of 
an agreement for preventing incidents at sea. (Interfax, 1132 GMT, 20 May 1998; 
FBIS-SOV-98-140) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
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By Mark Jones 
 
Yel'tsin creates fourth deputy premier slot 
President Boris Yel'tsin signed a decree (No. 553) appointing Ivan Rybkin as his 
envoy to the CIS states and bestowing on him the rank of deputy prime minister. 
Rybkin, the former Security Council secretary, held the title of deputy prime 
minister in charge of CIS affairs until the position was abolished by Sergei 
Kirienko in March (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 16 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-140). The 
appointment must have come as a shock to Kirienko, who had pledged to have 
no more than three deputy premier slots in his government. It must also be a 
shock to the Russian foreign ministry--and Yevgeni Primakov in particular--
because last month's dissolution of the Ministry for CIS Affairs transferred all 
functions of that department to Primakov's ministry. The elevation of Rybkin, a 
close ally of CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky, to Yel'tsin's 
plenipotentiary representative seems to indicate that the president wants to 
maintain his "personal touch" in managing CIS affairs (See also Jamestown 
Monitor, 15 May 98). 
 
Duma votes to restore Ministry of CIS Affairs 
On 22 May, the Russian Duma voted to restore the recently dissolved CIS 
cooperation ministry (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 May 98). This is not surprising, since 
the leaders of the various Duma subcommittees dedicated to CIS affairs are 
extremists who view the commonwealth as a way of maintaining Russian 
domination over the former republics of the USSR. These are the same Duma 
leaders who are blocking the ratification of the Russian-Ukrainian friendship 
treaty because it solidifies national borders and accepts the division of the Black 
Sea Fleet. They maintain that it is in Russia's interest to keep a ministry 
dedicated solely to CIS affairs rather than have CIS issues become diluted in the 
foreign ministry. 
 
The 1998 Berezovsky CIS tour hits the road 
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Newly appointed CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky spent his first weeks 
in office touring his new domain. He has traveled to, and met with the presidents 
of, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, and Georgia. It is obvious that 
Berezovsky intends to be more proactive than his predecessor, Ivan 
Korotchenya, in fostering CIS ties through the executive secretariat. Not 
surprisingly, Berezovsky's approach to aid integration is based on economics and 
the role of businessmen-entrepreneurs. After meeting with the Moldovan 
president, Berezovsky said, "To reform the CIS, all its members must root out 
their imperial mentality acquired during the times of the Russian Empire and the 
USSR." But he continued, "I do not consider 'empire' as a swear-word, if all 
members of an empire have equal rights." Unfortunately, Berezovsky did not give 
any historical examples of empires made up of members with equal rights 
(Infotag, 7 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-127). At another meeting, Berezovsky claimed 
that state monopolies have exhausted their potential in most CIS nations and 
said commonwealth agencies must "understand the entrepreneur's needs; the 
executive and legislative authorities in CIS countries need help from the CIS in 
the setting up of mechanisms and adoption of laws for entrepreneurs" (Interfax, 
19 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-139). 
 
Quieting the rumors that the CIS headquarters would be moving to Moscow to 
accommodate the new executive secretary, Berezovsky recently moved into his 
office at CIS headquarters in Minsk. He also purchased a plot of land near the 
Belarusian capital on which he intends to build a house (NTV, 0600 GMT, 8 May 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-128, and Radio Minsk, 1600 GMT, 20 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
141). 
 
CIS personnel appointments noted 
Russian Army general and director of the Federal Agency of Government 
Communications and Information (FAPSI), Aleksandr Starovoitov, was re-elected 
chairman of the CIS coordination council on government communications during 
the council's eighth session (ITAR-TASS, 13 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-133). 
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Former CIS Executive Secretary Ivan Korotchenya will continue to work in his old 
office building at CIS headquarters in Minsk. Korotchenya was appointed Boris 
Berezovsky's first deputy (Radio Minsk, 0400 GMT, 20 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
140). Both Presidents Yel'tsin and Lukashenka promised Korotchenya, a 
Belarusian, would be rewarded for his six years of service as the first CIS 
executive secretary. 
 
Valeri Droganov, chairman of the Russian State Customs Committee, was 
elected chairman of the Council of the Customs Service Chiefs of CIS countries. 
He succeeds Anatoli Kruglov (ITAR-TASS, 21 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-141). 
 
Russian Major General Pavel Lipsky was appointed commander of the CIS 
peacekeeping force in Tajikistan. Lipsky was deputy commander of the force for 
over a year (Interfax, 15 May 98; FBIS-UMA-98-135). 
 
CIS, Tajikistan sign accord on information exchange 
An agreement on information exchange has been signed between the CIS 
executive secretariat and the head of the Tajik president's executive staff. The 
agreement is aimed at strengthening the single "information space" of the CIS 
member states. The sides will exchange information about "political 
developments ... official meetings and ceremonies organized by the CIS 
countries and agencies; and agreements signed within the CIS framework" 
(Belapan, 13 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-133). These reasons seem dubious, 
however, because, as a member of the CIS, Tajikistan needs no additional 
agreements to share such common information. The truth of the matter is 
probably associated with another meaning of the phrase "information space" 
which in the past has indicated the linking of mass communications systems with 
Moscow in order to ensure the transmission of Russian-language television, 
radio, and newsprint to the former republics. Russians have been pushing for the 
recreation of such an "information space" since mid-1994. 
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Tajik-Russian border guards hold joint exercises 
Units of Tajik and CIS (therefore Russian) border guards held a two-day exercise 
near Dushanbe in mid-May. Tajik officials claim that this was the first time such a 
maneuver was held. It included a command-and-staff exercise and a live-fire 
portion involving 1,000 servicemen, aircraft, artillery, and armored vehicles 
(Radio Tajikistan, First Channel, 1000 GMT, 14 May 98; FBIS-UMA-98-134, and 
ITAR-TASS, 19 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-139). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Monica Florescu 
 
MOLDOVA 
Moldova struggles to produce a new government 
Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc presented the resignation of his government to the 
newly elected Moldovan parliament on 30 April. Deliberations over the candidacy 
for the post of premier then were held between the three Alliance of Democratic 
Forces (AFD) factions. After the creation of the center-right parliamentary 
alliance, the Democratic Convention of Moldova (CDM) ceded the chairmanship 
in the new legislature to the Democratic and Prosperous Moldova Bloc (BMDP) 
in exchange for the office of premier. The alliance faced serious differences 
concerning prime ministerial candidatures and, after an exhaustive debate, two 
names were produced--Nicolae Andronic, deputy chairman of (Snegur's) Party of 
Revival and Accord, and Valentin Dolganiuc, a leader in the Christian Democratic 
Popular Front. (Infotag, 2000 GMT, 30 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-121) 
 
However, Andronic failed to capture the necessary votes within the alliance's 
faction, while members of the alliance disagreed on Dolganiuc's candidacy. He 
was rejected by President Lucinschi for "lacking experience." In the end, Ciubuc 
was nominated by Lucinschi, with the condition that Ciubuc create a new cabinet 
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and present a new plan of government within 15 days. The Communist Party 
(CPM) proved unwilling to cooperate with the new government unless 
Communists were to be named ministers: If the CPM's opinion is ignored, Party 
members claimed, the convention will not vote for Ciubuc's government. In that 
case, everything will return to the zero point, and the president will have to 
nominate another candidate for the prime ministerial post. By the formula, this 
candidate must again be proposed by the CDM. If the president nominates 
Ciubuc once again and the parliament votes him down twice, the head of state 
may dissolve the parliament. However, Lucinschi said he did not want to turn the 
cabinet into an arena for a political struggle, but intended to "create a team of 
like-minded professionals." (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1156 GMT, 13 May 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-133) 
 
In addition, the CDM will vote for the new government only in case a compromise 
has been reached on the list of ministers, stated Mircea Snegur, the leader of the 
ruling parliamentary Alliance for Democracy and Reforms (ADR). (Infotag, 1950 
GMT, 19 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-140) 
 
Trandsniestr: no progress towards a peace agreement 
A year has passed since an agreement between the separatist Dniestr Republic 
and the Moldovan government was signed, in which the parties agreed to build a 
"common state." Exactly what features such a "common state" might display 
remained to be determined through negotiations and by mutual consent of the 
parties. At a meeting in Odessa on 20 March, the two sides and the two 
guarantor states, Russia and Ukraine, agreed that it was necessary to 
concentrate on the following "priority directions" regarding the current situation in 
Trandsniestr: 1) Delimitation and mutual delegation of powers and jurisdictions; 
2) Specific measures for the establishment of a common economic, social and 
legal space; 3) Deepening of mutual confidence and cooperation; 4) 
Determination of a mechanism of external and internal guarantees; 5) Securing 
the effective work of the Joint Control Commission; 6) Improvement of the forms 
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of activity of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces and the deployment of the Ukrainian 
peacekeepers (at the present moment, monitors) in the security zone. 
(Basapress, 1700 GMT, 8 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-128) 
 
However, the government of the self-proclaimed Dniestr Republic has recently 
decided to increase the number of customs and border troops in the security 
zone. The zone is controlled now by the peacekeepers of Russia, Moldova and 
the Dniestr Republic under the command of the Joint Control Commission (JCC). 
At a recent meeting JCC members said Dniestr border guards already have 
taken a post in the Dubasari district alongside the Dniestr River. This action 
contravenes the four-party Odessa accord of 20 March, when the presidents of 
Moldova and Ukraine, the Russian premier and Dniestr leader agreed to close all 
border guard and customs posts between Moldova and the Dniestr region. 
(Basapress, 2000 GMT, 14 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-135) 
 
In addition, a statement passed by the Union of Dniestr Defenders, the most 
influential public organization in the self-styled republic, reads that "in case the 
new Moldovan leadership resumes speaking about a unified and indivisible 
Moldova at the forthcoming negotiations, we will begin insisting on giving up the 
idea of building one common state with Moldova, and on the further consolidation 
of the sovereign and independent Dniestr Moldovan Republic." (Infotag, 1950 
GMT, 19 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-140) 
 
UKRAINE 
Dim prospects for solving the Chornobyl problem 
On 4 May the general director of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant, Sergei 
Parashin, was dismissed for "crude violations of his duties and executive 
discipline" (Interfax, 1430 GMT, 4 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-124). This took place a 
few days before the Kyiv meeting of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) from 8-12 May. Ukraine expected that two grant 
agreements on the financing of upgrades on the cover, or sarcophagus, facility at 
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the Chornobyl nuclear power station would be signed. The first grant agreement, 
to be signed by the EBRD and the Ukrainian Nuclear Regulation Administration, 
envisages technical assistance (about $10 million) for tighter controls over the 
procedure and technology for the licensing of nuclear power stations, EBRD 
Director for Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria Yuri Poluneev told a briefing. The 
second agreement deals exclusively with the cover facility at the station and aims 
to make the facility environmentally safe, he said. In total, the two grants will 
amount to some $60 million, Poluneev said. Approximately $1.2 billion reportedly 
is required for completing the construction of the two power units. President 
Kuchma stated that Ukraine still needs more money in order to build two other 
power plants at Rovno and Khmelnytsky. Some 80-85 percent of the construction 
operation has already been completed at the second power unit in Khmelnytsky 
and the fourth power unit in Rovno. In addition, he estimated that $760 million is 
needed in order to close down Chornobyl under the most environmentally safe 
conditions. (Interfax, 1159 GMT, 5 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-125) 
 
Last week, the third unit of the Chornobyl plant started functioning under normal 
regime, giving 70 percent of the planned output. The repairs of the pipe, 
damaged by the explosion 12 years ago, have begun. The work, with a cost of 
$1.8 million, is financed by the US government. (ITAR-TASS, 1953 GMT, 17 May 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-137) 
 
The Ukrainian branch of the international environmental organization 
Greenpeace has protested against the decision to put a generating unit at 
Chornobyl back into operation. Greenpeace Ukraine also said a "nuclear lobby" 
was using the bogey of a new nuclear disaster in a bid to obtain from the West 
"at any cost $1.6 billion to complete the construction of obsolete nuclear units at 
the Khmelnitsky and Rovno plants." (Interfax, 1829 GMT, 14 May 98; FBIS-TEN-
98-134) 
 
Parliament opens on shaky ground 
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Ukraine's newly elected prime minister, Valeri Pustovoytenko, gave up his seat in 
parliament in order to perform effectively his function in government (Serhiy Larin 
replaced him in parliament). (ITAR-TASS, 2042 GMT, 11 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
131) 
 
Parliament opened on 12 May with a total of 450 deputies. The following is the 
breakdown of factions: the Communists have 125 members on their faction list, 
according to Oleksandr Bandurko, who is in charge of preparing the first 
parliament session. Next is the Popular Democratic Party with 77 seats, followed 
by nationalist Popular Rukh (50), Hromada ("The Power," 41), the agrarian-
socialist bloc (36), the Greens (19) and united social-democrats (17). 
 
None of the parties has an absolute majority in the 450-seat legislature, but 
leftists may form a majority if they unite. According to unofficial sources, such 
talks are underway. Some sources said that the leftists plan to nominate former 
speaker Oleksandr Moroz to chair the parliament. Moroz, who leads the 
Socialists, had been backed by the Hromada leader, ex-premier Pavel 
Lazarenko, during the election race. (ITAR-TASS, 0137 GMT, 7 May 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-127) 
 
Comment 
No speaker has been elected thus far, and most party heads disagree on the 
nature of the position, as well as on the legitimacy of the last election results. 
Most party leaders agree that electoral reform needs to take place in Ukraine. 
For now, talks regarding possible coalitions are being conducted on the two 
extremes of the spectrum: one on the left, made up of the Progressive Socialist 
Party of Ukraine and the Communist Party of Ukraine, and one on the right, 
consisting of the People's Democratic Party and the United Social Democratic 
Party of Ukraine. 
 
Odessa mayoral elections declared invalid 
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A court in the Kirovohrad oblast invalidated the results of mayoral elections in 
Odessa and annulled the decision by the Odessa election commission that had 
confirmed Eduard Hurvitz's election as mayor. Charges against Hurvitz's election 
were brought by his main contender, the present Odessa oblast governor Ruslan 
Bodelan, who accused Hurvitz's supporters of numerous violations of the election 
procedure. (Intelnews, 0151 GMT, 7 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-127) 
 
Protracted confrontation between local bodies of power--the regional state 
administration, on the one hand, and the Odessa city council and its executive 
committee, on the other--has brought to a standstill important and promising 
projects for the region and for Ukraine's economic health as a whole. Of late, not 
just the political forces of the city, but even its population has split into opposite 
camps. In addition to the ever more complicated socioeconomic processes in 
Odessa, there has been a steep rise in crime, which could be seen particularly 
clearly during the election campaign. The prime minister plans to carry out an 
examination of the situation in the area. (Radio Ukraine World Service, 1600 
GMT, 15 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-135) 
 
Crimea's government suspended 
Hours after electing Communist Party member Leonid Hrach as its speaker, the 
Crimean parliament chose to dismiss the peninsula's entire government, with 58 
out of 73 deputies voting on the matter. The discharged government will continue 
fulfilling its responsibilities until a new government is elected. The parliament also 
elected members of its presidium, as well as several committee heads. The full 
presidium features six Communists, six unaffiliated deputies, one Socialist and 
one Soyuz Party deputy. In accepting the position of speaker, Hrach said he will 
strive to have close relations with Kyiv. He said the "reasonable" extension of 
Crimean authority is possible. He added he did not expect tension between the 
Crimean Parliament and the president. Moreover, he intends to postpone his 
idea of renewing the Soviet Union, but will push for close cooperation with CIS 
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countries in economic, political, cultural and other fields. (Intelnews, 0244 GMT, 
15 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-135) 
 
BELARUS 
Positive prospects for the Belarus-Russia Union 
The eighth session of the Union of Belarus and Russia Parliamentary Assembly 
was held in Homel on 4 May. It was agreed that a new Union parliament is to be 
elected next year at the same time as parliamentary elections in both Belarus 
and Russia. Also, further rapprochement between Russia and Belarus and the 
creation of a common economic space would make it necessary in future to 
introduce a common currency. According to Pyotr Prakapovich, it will take at 
least four to five years after such a decision is made by the leaders of both 
countries for such a plan to be implemented. (Belapan, 1320 GMT, 16 May 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-138) 
 
The Union may face future expansion. Yugoslavia has expressed its wish to join 
the Union's parliament, while Belarus is hoping that Ukraine will join as well: 
"currently nothing prevents Kazakhstan, Ukraine, or Armenia from joining our 
union," stated Russian Duma Chairman Gennadi Nikolaevich Seleznev, 
chairman of the Union Parliamentary Assembly. He commented on the nature of 
the union between Russia and Belarus: "It is clear that sovereign Belarus and 
Russia are at issue. This implies that they would rather unite in a confederation. 
Of course, like any confederation, this rather implies a political union. We are still 
working in terns of our economic integration, but one can also feel the political 
integration." In other words, Belarus is ready to unite with Russia on an equal 
basis, and is not willing to adhere to any interstate union, as Moscow would like 
to see. Regarding the possible dual citizenship issue, he stated that "every 
Belarusian and Russian citizen will preserve his national citizenship and at the 
same time be a citizen of the Belarusian-Russian Union, but no more." (Interfax, 
1754 GMT, 15 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-135) 
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Belarus' view on mutual debts 
President Lukashenka recently addressed the problem of mutual debts with 
former Soviet republics. "Ukraine owes Belarus about $214 million," said 
Lukashenka at a CIS forum of journalists which began in Minsk on 5 May. 
Speaking on Belarus' debt to Russia, Lukashenka pointed out that this debt--
"slightly more than $100 million for oil, $200 million for gas and so on"--is not the 
government's liability but debts accumulated by companies. He added that 
Russian economic entities also owe Belarusian enterprises the same amount for 
the products delivered. "Belarus spends $410 million annually to guard the 
airspace," Lukashenka said. However, he added that he had always spoken of 
Russia's debt to Belarus only "in response to attacks of the Russian side." 
According to the Belarusian president, during his last meeting with Russian 
President Boris Yel'tsin in Moscow the problem of mutual debts was "settled in 
the sense that we never reproach each other, and if there is a debt, we will settle 
accounts in a civilised manner." During the meeting, he added, the sides agreed 
on the way Belarus will pay for Russian gas and other energy resources, and on 
the way Russia will pay for Belarusian products. (Belapan, 1732 GMT, 5 May 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-125) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA 
Dashnaks included in cabinet; party legalized 
President Robert Kocharian has appointed two members of the Dashnaktsutyun 
party, Vagan Ovanisian and Levon Mkrtchian, to the cabinet. Ovanisian will serve 
as adviser to the president for public relations, particularly with groups and 
lobbies in the diaspora, and Mkrtchian will take on the position of science and 
education minister. (Snark, 28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-118) 
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On 6 May, Kocharian officially repealed his predecessor's December 1994 ban 
on the activities of the Dashnaktsutyun. Petrosian had accused the party, which 
has been run by Armenians in the diaspora, of fostering foreign interference in 
Armenian politics, terrorism and drug trafficking. Since Petrosian's resignation in 
March, Kocharian has released Dashnak leaders from jail and allowed them to 
set up an office and press organs. (Interfax, 6 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-126) 
 
A possibility of normalized ties between Armenia and Turkey? 
The Armenian news service Snark reported a story that appeared in the Turkish 
Daily News on 1 April. According to the Turkish paper, Robert Kocharian has "put 
to official Ankara a proposal to start direct dialogue between Armenia and Turkey 
without the interference of a third party (that is to say, Baku), to set up trade and 
economic cooperation without any political preconditions, and also to open the 
Armenian-Turkish frontier." (Snark, 1 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-092) 
 
The public position of the new Armenian government towards Turkey does not 
seem more conciliatory than that of the previous government. In a 25 April 
interview, the Armenian foreign minister elaborated his country's position: 
"Armenia's approach to Turkey will be the following: if unilateral negative 
manifestations continue from the side of Ankara, then Turkey should be left in no 
doubt that our attitude to it cannot be positive." Turkey has conditioned the 
normalization of relations with Armenia on the resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh dispute and has participated in a partial embargo against Armenia. The 
new government, like the old one, requests that Turkey abandon those stands. In 
at least one respect the position of the new government will make it more difficult 
to improve relations with Ankara: Whereas the previous government had 
occasionally called on Turkey to recognize that the massacres and deportations 
perpetrated during WWI constituted "genocide," the new government has placed 
much greater emphasis on the issue. (Respublika Armenia, 23 Apr 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-115) 
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However, during a visit to Georgia on 1 May, the speaker of the Armenian 
parliament, Khosrov Arutyunian, called for re-establishing relations with Turkey. 
"Armenia and Turkey should restore relations sooner or later, both countries 
need it as does the whole region," he said. "Armenia will do its best to gradually 
re-establish relations with Turkey. Of course, it requires political will and desire of 
Turkish government and people," he noted. (ITAR-TASS, 1 May 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-121) 
 
Turkey's envoys attended the April meeting of the Black Sea Economic 
Conference (BSEC) which was hosted by Yerevan, while Azerbaijan boycotted 
the event. The minister of state, Sahin Refaiddin, led Turkey's delegation. When 
asked about the possibility of creating a free economic zone among the BSEC 
countries (which cannot be arranged until Turkey's and Azerbaijan's embargo of 
Armenia is lifted), he said that "It is important to note that these economic steps 
and intentions lead to appropriate political steps and vice versa. Politics and the 
economy should interact. Our arrival in Yerevan also demonstrates our readiness 
to create an appropriate political scenario for cooperation." He emphasized that 
prosperity requires peace. According to the state minister, peace requires a 
"settlement of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh and, under 
the norms of international law, the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani territory." 
(Snark, 30 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-121) 
 
It seems that the Armenian side is trying to arrange a normalization of economic 
and trade relations while increasing its political demands on Turkey. So far, 
Ankara has not altered its position and has presented the same terms to the new 
government as it did to the previous leadership. 
 
An Azerbaijani paper reported the Greek response to the possibility of warming 
relations between Yerevan and Ankara. The national defense minister, 
Apostolos-Athanasios Tsokhatzopoulos, pointed out that historic Armenian lands 
are now part of Turkey and drew parallels between that and the issue of northern 
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Cyprus. The national defense minister made those comments and the 
parliamentary speaker Kaklamanis expressed sorrow at a ceremony marking the 
83rd anniversary of the "genocide." (Azadlyg, 29 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-119) 
 
Ovanes Igitian, chairman of the Armenian National Assembly's standing 
commission on foreign relations, also raised the possibility of revising Armenia's 
borders with Turkey. He said that the issue of recovering the territories ceded to 
Turkey by Russia in a 1921 treaty should remain open. He suggested that 
Armenia should take up the issue not only with Turkey but also with Russia: 
 
"Today's Russia, which we consider our ally, is the legal successor of that Russia 
and it has declared this, while we consider Turkey an adversary. It is clear that it 
is easier to talk about problems with an ally than an adversary. However, this 
subject has never been discussed with Russia, and it is difficult for me to say 
whether Russia will take some steps or not if such a discussion takes place." 
 
Furthermore, he linked the issue of the recognition of "genocide" to the territorial 
issue: "From the legal point of view, the lands that we lost--Nakhichevan, 
Erzurum, and Kars--were lost as a result of the Russian-Turkish agreement and 
physically, of course, we were expelled because of the genocide. The reason for 
Turkey's concern is that if the genocide is recognized, the next step will be the 
compulsory return of the lands. If we want to present the issue legally and 
seriously, we should work toward recognition of the 1921 treaty as illegal." 
(Noyan Tapan, 0500 GMT, 7 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-129) 
 
Armenian MP on Nagorno-Karabakh 
Speaking of Karabakh, Igitian explicitly described the Armenian side's premise 
when it calls for a Baku-Stepanakert dialogue. The current OSCE system is 
flawed, Igitian said, because it recognizes three warring parties (Nagorno-
Karabakh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) and three mediators (Russia, France, 
United States). This approach is wrong, in his view, because "We could not even 
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be considered the third side. We are an interested state that could be the 
guarantor of the existence of Nagorno-Karabakh." The calls for direct dialogue 
are based on the false claim that Armenia remained aloof from the conflict. 
(Noyan Tapan, 0500 GMT, 7 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-129) 
 
DAGESTAN 
An attempted coup in Dagestan? 
Mukhu Aliev, speaker of Dagestan's parliament, warned against plans to storm a 
village occupied by Wahhabis who recently staged an uprising in Makhachkala. 
He said that the situation in the republic is "absolutely uncontrollable" and "any 
further carelessness from Moscow may result in a situation where promises of 
Chechen leaders about a united Islamic state in the North Caucasus turn a 
reality. " (TASS, 26 May 98; NEXIS) Aliev was referring to the Congress of 
Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan which was held in Chechnya on 26 April and 
elected Shamil Basaev as its leader. The congress aims to unite Chechnya and 
Dagestan. (Agence France Presse, 27 April 98; NEXIS)  
 
Nadir Khachilaev, a Duma deputy and leader of the Russian Muslim Union, his 
brother Magomed, and their supporters seized a government building in 
Makhachkala on 21 May. Whether this action was an attempted coup d'etat 
remains unclear. Khachilaev and his bodyguards had an altercation with 
policemen from the Dagestani interior ministry as a result of which one policeman 
was shot dead. The police surrounded Khachilaev's house on the night of 20 
May. On the following day, with the help of a large crowd of supporters, those 
inside were able to force their way out and take over the government building. 
While holding the building they replaced the Russian flag with the green Islamic 
flag and called for the resignation of the State Council and direct suffrage to elect 
a new republican leader. Twelve thousand supporters rallied outside the building. 
After a few hours, Khachilaev's group agreed to leave the building in return for 
safe passage and the summoning of the regional parliament. (AAP Newsfeed, 22 
May 98; NEXIS) 
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Russia's deputy prime minister in charge of national policies, Ramazan 
Abdulatipov, commented that only direct general elections of Dagestan's leader 
can provide a real mandate to assure that the leadership is not dependent on 
backroom intrigue. (TASS, 21 May 98; NEXIS) (For more background information 
about Dagestan's government and social problems, see Magomedkhan 
Magomedkhanov, "Dagestan: Rents in the Fabric of Government," in 
Perspective, Volume 8, Number 4.) 
 
In another ominous episode, residents of the Novolakskoe district began a 
blockade of the road linking Dagestan and Chechnya on 16 May. Dagestanis 
have endured repeated abductions, cattle and car thefts and other criminal acts 
perpetrated by Chechens who cross the border into Dagestan. The action in the 
Novolakskoe district was prompted by the disappearance of a chairman of a 
collective farm from the district on 13 May. (ITAR-TASS, 18 May 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-138) 
 
CHECHNYA 
Russian envoy abducted 
Russia's envoy to Chechnya, Valentin Vlasov, was abducted in Chechnya on 1 
May. Starting that day, Dagestani army and police units along the border with 
Chechnya were placed on alert. ( ITAR-TASS, 1 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-121) 
Russia's deputy prime minister, Ivan Rybkin, Security Council deputy secretary, 
General Boris Agapov, and representative of the Russian government to 
Chechnya, Georgi Kurin, flew immediately to Dzhokar-gala. (ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 1 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-121). 
 
The circumstances of Vlasov's abduction were somewhat unusual: He was 
traveling with only one bodyguard and failed to notify the Federal Bodyguard 
Service of his flight to Chechnya. (Interfax, 5 May 98; FBIS-TOT-98-125) 
President Maskhadov of Chechnya asserted in a letter to President Yel'tsin, as 
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he has on numerous occasions, that the kidnapping was staged by forces 
committed to undermining Russo-Chechen relations. (ITAR-TASS, 5 May 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-125)  
 
On 7 May the Chechen authorities informed their Russian counterparts that 
Vlasov was being held in Russia. (Interfax, 7 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-127) On 13 
May several people were killed when a bomb exploded in the center of Dzhokar-
gala. No one claimed responsibility for the attack, which apparently targeted the 
head of Chechnya's anti-kidnapping unit, Magomed Magomadov, who was 
investigating the Vlasov kidnapping. Magomadov escaped unharmed. (AAP 
Newsfeed, 14 May 98; NEXIS) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
UTO gives reasons for latest clashes as fighting finally ends 
Renewed fighting broke out between the Tajik government and United Tajik 
Opposition (UTO) troops near Rokhaty (10 km east of the capital) and Kofarnihon 
on 29 April (see previous Digest) and then spread into Dushanbe itself, causing 
up to 25 civilian deaths. Finally the Tajik government and opposition leaders 
were able to establish a cease-fire and bring the conflict to an end on 2 May. 
UTO units managed to seize control of much of the Dushanbe-Kofarnihon 
highway and even penetrated the eastern part (mainly the Karategin district) of 
Dushanbe. Rahmon Sanginov, a former UTO commander (who was expelled by 
the UTO leadership last summer), is considered to be primarily responsible for 
extending the battle into residential areas in eastern Dushanbe (Interfax, 0735 
GMT, 2 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-122). Sanginov's men fired grenades and mortar 
shells into the eastern part of the city, hitting the presidential palace (which 
sustained no damage), the Pakistani embassy (which received minor damage), 
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and destroying dozens of houses, as well as damaging water mains and 
electricity lines (ITAR-TASS, 1038 GMT, 3 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-123, and 
ITAR-TASS, 1244 GMT, 3 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-123). Shells also fell on central 
Dushanbe, but fortunately resulted in neither structural damage nor loss of life 
(Interfax, 0822 GMT, 2 May 98; FBIS-TOT-98-122). 
 
Following discussions between President Rahmonov, UTO leaders, and 
representatives of the Tajik defense and security ministries on 2 May, an 
agreement was reached for the withdrawal of both Tajik government and 
opposition troops from the Karategin district and from the highway to Kofarnihon. 
Government forces would retain only one checkpoint in Karategin, while the UTO 
and interior ministry troops would set up two joint posts near the village of 
Teppai-Samarqandi (15 km east of Dushanbe), where the opposition field 
commanders had set up their headquarters. A special commission led by First 
Deputy Prime Minister and UTO First Vice Chairman Ali Akbar Turajonzoda, 
Deputy Prime Minister Abdurahmon Azimov, and the ministers of the interior, 
defense and security (presumably the police forces) was set up in order to meet 
with the opposition field commanders and oversee the troop withdrawals. UN 
military observers accompanied the commission to Teppai-Samarqandi on 3 May 
in order to help supervise the troop withdrawal. However, Tajik government 
forces prevented UN representatives from entering Dushanbe's Karategin district 
in order to form an independent assessment of the destruction caused by the 
recent shelling (ITAR-TASS, 1038 GMT, 3 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-123). 
 
On 30 April the UTO leadership issued a statement outlining its views on the 
causes of the renewed fighting, in which it primarily blamed the government for 
reneging on the terms of the 5 April agreement that had ended the first outbreak 
of fighting in Kofarnihon (see previous two Digests). According to the terms of 
this agreement, both government and opposition troops would have to withdraw 
from Kofarnihon and the government would cede a 30 percent share of the 
district administrative organs to UTO representatives. Although the opposition 
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units did withdraw to their designated training camps, UTO leaders assert that 
not all government forces were pulled out of Kofarnihon, and the political reform 
of local administrative organs did not occur. The UTO leadership also sent an 
open letter with this statement to Paolo Lembo, the UN secretary-general's acting 
envoy to Tajikistan (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1600 GMT, 1 May 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-123). There has not yet been a public reaction to this letter from 
the UN observer mission in Tajikistan, other than to praise President Rahmonov 
for his role in negotiating the most recent cease-fire agreement (ITAR-TASS 
World Service, 1338 GMT, 4 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-124). 
 
UN secretary-general calls for election postponement 
On 13 May, Paolo Lembo, the UN secretary-general's acting envoy to Tajikistan, 
met with Said Abdullo Nuri, chairman of both the UTO and the National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC), to discuss the slow pace of the peace 
process and to transmit a message from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 
the upcoming parliamentary elections in Tajikistan. According to the terms of the 
peace agreement signed in July 1997, parliamentary elections are to be held in 
the Fall of 1998, by which time all opposition parties are to have been granted full 
legal status (so that they may participate in the elections). However, Annan sent 
a message to the UN Security Council calling for the elections to be postponed 
until the following year, on the grounds that the peace process has not achieved 
adequate progress to ensure a free and fair election (Voice of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 1600 GMT, 13 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-134). However, Nuri, 
while agreeing that the peace process has been proceeding too slowly, firmly 
supports holding new parliamentary elections before the end of 1998 (Voice of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1600 GMT, 13 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-134). 
 
Tajikistan joins anti-Islamic 'troika'; parliament bans religious parties  
Following Uzbek President Karimov's announcement from Moscow on 6 May that 
he, President Yel'tsin, and President Rahmonov had decided to form a "troika" to 
combat the negative influences of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia and 
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Russia more effectively (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0925 GMT, 6 May 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-126), on 22 May the Tajik parliament passed a law banning the 
formation of religious political parties. This law instills new life into the Tajik 
Supreme Soviet's 1993 decree outlawing the Islamic Renaissance Party, and 
directly contradicts the terms set out in the political protocol of the 1997 peace 
agreement between the Tajik government and the UTO, under which all of the 
opposition parties are to be granted full legal status. The new law also prohibits 
the establishment of political parties "whose purposes and activity aim to 
overthrow the constitutional system by force and organize armed groups or 
groups propagating vengeance, inter-ethnic conflicts, social and religious 
hostility." Nor may political organizations be formed in national security 
structures, law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor's offices or in other security 
and law enforcement organs (Interfax, 1607 GMT, 22 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
142). 
 
One day prior to its ratification of this new law, the Tajik parliament rejected 
President Rahmonov's appointments of UTO leaders Ali Akbar Turajonzoda and 
Dawlat Usmon to the positions of first deputy prime minister and minister of 
economics and foreign trade, respectively. The reason given for the rejections 
was that neither Turajonzoda nor Usmon was present at the parliament session 
in order to answer questions. According to Tajikistan's present constitution, the 
president may nominate the same candidate three times for a position in the 
government's executive structure and only has to nominate someone new after 
the parliament's third rejection (Interfax, 1311 GMT, 21 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
141). 
 
Comment 
If the law banning religious political parties is permitted to stand, it will invalidate 
the entire peace process in Tajikistan and even the 1997 peace agreement. The 
Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) is the strongest member of the UTO and its 
leaders also largely comprise the top UTO leadership: Said Abdullo Nuri, Ali 
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Akbar Turajonzoda, and Dawlat Usmon are all members of the IRP. The general 
peace agreement signed in 1997 bears the signatures of President Rahmonov 
and Mr. Nuri. To instate a new ban on religious parties is to deny Nuri's authority 
and the legitimacy of the alliance which he represents. In fact, this new law 
deprives Nuri and his party of even the opportunity to achieve equal status with 
President Rahmonov and his supporters, thereby denying the validity of the 
peace agreement itself, because the agreement represents the two sides' 
recognition that each has an equal and legitimate interest in the peaceful reform 
of Tajikistan's political system and that this reform can only be reached by their 
cooperation as equals. 
 
With the peace process in such jeopardy, it is surprising that thus far there has 
been no public reaction whatsoever from either the UN observer mission in 
Tajikistan or OSCE representatives. The UN recently (26 May) released a 
statement condemning the Tajik government's participation in Russia and 
Uzbekistan's anti-Islamic alliance and called on the Russian, Uzbek, and Tajik 
administrations to refrain from taking any new actions which might further 
exacerbate tensions between the UTO and the Tajik government. However, the 
UN has yet to react to the new ban on religious parties, or to the Tajik 
parliament's rejection of Dawlat Usmon and Ali Akbar Turajonzoda's government 
appointments. 
 
Tajik parliament increases national security ministry's authority 
At its 22 May session, the Tajik parliament also adopted a law which will increase 
the powers of the special services within the ministry by 20-25 percent. Many 
parliament members were opposed to this new law and actually favored limiting 
the authority of certain organs within the ministry, particularly the authority of the 
counterintelligence and special operations divisions, but a personal appeal from 
President Rahmonov resulted in the new law's adoption. The Tajik president told 
parliament representatives that crime and corruption in the military and 
(unspecified) "security structures" had grown to such proportions that only the 
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national security ministry would be capable of restoring law and order in the 
country. The president further stated that in order to undertake this task, the 
ministry needed enhanced powers (Interfax, 1607 GMT, 22 May 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-142).  
 
Tajikistan to receive additional international financial aid 
On 17 May it was announced that Tajikistan will receive a $50 million credit from 
the World Bank in order to carry out an economic restructuring program and to 
maintain its balance of payments. The IMF is also extending a $120 million credit 
to the Tajik government to support a three-year restructuring and privatization 
plan, which IMF and World Bank experts helped to draw up, together with Tajik 
government representatives (Interfax, 0814 GMT, 17 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
137). 
 
On 20 May, at the conclusion of the Paris Donor Conference, it was announced 
that the Tajik government will be granted a total of $515 million over the next 
three years from individual donor countries in order to aid in Tajikistan's 
economic stabilization, as well as in the reform of the economy. Tajikistan will 
receive more than half of these funds ($340 million) in 1998-1999, $280 million of 
which is to be used to support its balance of payments and to maintain its public 
sector economy, and $60 million of which will be in the form of humanitarian aid 
(Radio Tajikistan First Channel Network, 0400 GMT, 21 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
141). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
ESTONIA 
Meri's admission of visa regime possibility widens schism over EU 
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The inclusion of Estonia in negotiations with the European Union has led to a 
certain amount of animosity on the part of the other two Baltic states, which as 
yet have not been invited to begin EU talks. The latest volley came as a result of 
Estonian President Lennart Meri's interview with Poland's Rzeczpospolita 
newspaper. In response to a hypothetical question, Meri declared that, if it were 
to be a condition of admittance to the EU, then Estonia would establish a visa 
regime with Latvia and Lithuania. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1000 GMT, 
28 Apr 98) Since there has been no indication that the EU has requested such an 
action, the motivation for the question is murky. The result, however, was 
undeniably clear: A statement from the Lithuanian government's press service 
criticized the EU for inviting only Estonia to talks and described Estonia's 
behavior toward the other Baltic states as "arrogant." A press representative for 
the Estonian government subsequently reiterated Estonia's position that it will do 
everything possible to ensure the speedy invitation of Latvia and Lithuania to EU 
accession talks. (Radio Tallinn Network, 1500 GMT, 30 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
120). 
 
Military feels the lack of money, men and materiel 
While Estonia may have developed economically to a sufficient extent for 
possible inclusion in the European Union, the growth of the country's armed 
forces has not been smooth. Its air force and navy, especially, have faced 
hurdles in acquiring money, men and materiel. 
 
The air force can claim possession of two Mi-2 HOPLITE helicopters (and only 
one of those is operational) as well as two An-2 COLT, small military transport 
aircraft. [The border troops, on the other hand, have four Mi-8T helicopters 
(configured to serve as rescue helicopters) and two L-410 Turbolet.] The 
country's lack of haste in acquiring materiel is intentional, however, according to 
its commander-in-chief, Col. Vello Loemaa. With the long-term objective of 
joining NATO, the focus has been on developing an air defense system as well 
as ensuring that all officers have a command of the English language and that all 
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personnel are well-trained. As of June 1997, the air force consisted of 37 officers, 
14 NCOs, 316 lower-enlisted ranks, and 21 civilian employees. In addition to the 
air force base that opened in Aemani in April 1997, an air defense division is also 
planned--with bases in Aemani, Tallinn and Tapa--which is to receive 
approximately 100 ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns. (Flug Revue, May 98, p. 8; FBIS-
SOV-98-114) 
 
There certainly will be no increase in air force personnel if a recent proposal 
submitted by Estonian student organizations is accepted by parliament. The 
students propose the exemption from military service of all full-time students 
enrolled in 1994-98. While they are gathering support from some MPs, other 
parties, as well as the Reserve Officers Body, have condemned the proposal. 
The defense ministry and the defense forces are applying for the compulsory 
military service of nearly 2,000 university-educated young men this year. (Baltic 
News Service Daily Report, 1600 GMT, 27 Apr 98) 
 
Like the air force, the navy remains close to the larval stage. According to the 
commander of the Tallinn naval base, Capt. Maj. Andres Ehrenbusch, the 
Estonian navy has only three vessels that can be classed as ships, while five of 
the navy's nine vessels are non-operational, awaiting repair. The average age of 
the vessels is 28-30 years, Ehrenbusch told the Baltic News Service. Meanwhile, 
the Border Guard Department maintains a fleet of 70 vessels, including 11 of the 
ship class. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1300 GMT, 14 Apr 98) 
 
It would be rash, however, to view the disparate materiel inventories simply as a 
result of a growing rivalry between the border guard service and the military 
branches. Rather, Estonia has had to balance its concern to maintain border 
security with a view toward possible NATO inclusion and a need to establish 
interoperability with members of the alliance. Toward that end, this June Estonian 
troops are scheduled to participate in three NATO Partnership for Peace 
exercises. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1600 GMT, 5 May 98) 
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LATVIA 
Working group develops draft defense plan 
Estonia's armed forces were not the only Baltic military which did not fare well 
under recent scrutiny. Experts of the bilateral US-Latvia working group 
(established under the US-Baltic Charter) helped to develop a draft defense plan 
that envisages a small well-trained infantry army. Once again, however, Latvia's 
minuscule defense budget was determined to be insufficient. As in the case of 
Estonia, Western groups recommend the allotment of at least two percent of 
GNP for defense expenditures. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1600 GMT, 6 
May 98) 
 
LITHUANIA 
Seimas approves defense reorganization; move may not be enough 
While Lithuania's defense strategy may not cause as much dismay as those of its 
Baltic counterparts, even the steps Vilnius has taken may not prove to be 
sufficient. The Lithuanian parliament voted earlier this month to adopt a law on 
the organization of the national defense system and military service in order to 
bring the army closer to NATO standards. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 
1600 GMT, 5 May 98) However, NATO's deputy secretary-general, Klaus-Peter 
Klaiber, told Reuters that the alliance disagrees with the Baltic security 
assessment and is in no rush to admit Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, regardless 
of the countries' levels of readiness. "I don't think NATO membership for the 
Baltic countries is a burning issue as our assessment of risk is a little different 
than in the Baltic countries," Klaiber said. (Baltic News Service, 1800 GMT, 27 
Apr 98) 
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